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ABSTRACT 
 
It is estimated that crude oil, tourism and illicit drug trade are among the top five most 
financially inducing business in the world. Drug cartels conducts sophisticated and well 
organised activities including money laundering and monitoring of large networks of their 
couriers. In past the decade, the United Kingdom has incurred large expenditure on the 
treatment of drug related illnesses and, on the enforcement of drug control laws. Several 
drug laws are enacted to dealing with the waves of illicit drugs in the country. There is 
controversy over the ways by which the properties of the drug traffickers and suspected drug 
dealer, are seized by the State; in order to seize anyone’s private property prior to 
commencement of legal proceedings to effect permanent forfeiture, the law enforcement 
agencies are only required to show “probable cause” that the property being seized is 
acquired with the profit of drug crime alternatively, that the property facilitates drug 
criminal activities. Using data from academic materials and United Kingdom case laws, the 
paper argues that the United Kingdom drug trafficking laws particularly the enforcement of 
“civil asset recovery” under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 and, the “Criminal 
confiscation” under the Drug trafficking Act 1994 violates the International Human Rights 
Laws.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Drug trafficking is currently one of the world’s fastest growing industry with multi-
billion dollars value and, touching every country. According to the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) estimation, between 2 and 5 percent of the world’s Gross Domestic Product are 
from money laundering (Annan, 1998). 
In recent years, there has been a growing concern over the manner in which 
properties of ‘drug traffickers’ are confiscated or forfeited pursuant to the provisions of the 
Customs and Excise Management Act 1979, the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 
(Codes of Practice; Modified Code C and Code D) Order 2002, and Drug Trafficking Act 
1994. The only requirement for the law enforcement agencies to be able to confiscate a 
person’s property and initiate court actions for permanent forfeiture is, if they can show 
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probable cause which is the  least standard of civil proof, that the property was used to 
facilitate drug related offences or that the property is a benefit of drug related offences. In 
civil proceedings, probable cause can be established by mere hearsay evidence.  
 The acceptance of probable cause as yardstick to measuring guilt violates the 
person’s right to fair hearing enshrined in various human rights laws, treaties and 
conventions such as Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights. It defeats the 
objects of the requirements for the presumption of innocence which is the cornerstone of 
legal proceedings in both criminal and civil charges. In the United Kingdom, in some cases, 
the accused persons are denied the right to question their accusers as to circumvent the 
burden of proof that their properties are not benefits of crime and are not aid to the crime of 
drug trafficking.  
In the circumstances where individual properties can be confiscated based on flimsy 
evidence such as the words of informants, who themselves are in some instances,  accused 
criminals, ex-convicts and profit-seekers that benefits from their testimonies,  by infringing 
the due process of law and assisting in the violation of the human rights of the of the accused. 
 In the making of drug policy and in the enactment of drug trafficking legislation 
worldwide, the policy/law makers are typically faced with two issues namely - supply 
reduction and demand reduction. The former involves making laws and policies tailored 
towards the reduction of narcotic supply and, the later is about the treatment of the treatment 
of drug related illnesses. The main objective of this paper is to critically evaluate the supply 
reduction efforts of the United Kingdom government.  
 
METHODS AND MATERIALS 
 
Data on drugs misuse and drugs availability are used for the purpose of substantiating 
logical arguments. Much of the discourse is based on decided cases. The paper places heavy 
reliance on the activities of the United Kingdom law enforcement agencies; the crown 
prosecution service and the courts with emphasis on broad perspective of the United 
Kingdom national laws on drug trafficking; possession of controlled drugs; and, the UK 
compliance with international human rights standards with regards to the handling of drug 
traffickers and, the confiscation and forfeiture of assets with particular focus on the Misuse 
of Drugs Act 1971, the Customs and Excise Management Act 1979, the Criminal Justice 
(International Co-operation) Act 1990, the Drug trafficking Act 1994, the European 
Convention on Human Rights (Human Rights Act, 1998) and the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights of 1948. 
 Drug trafficking is huge enterprise with very profitable income to the drug cartels and 
traffickers. It does not require the advertising of merchandise yet customers are never scarce. 
The criminal networks that control the business across the world have similar traits- skilful 
and ruthless; often prepared and willing to risk everything including their lives to defend 
their goods and colleagues against all organised law enforcement activities of governments 
tailored towards curtailing their illicit activities.  
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Drug trafficking networks are willing and capable of infiltrating the corridors of 
national and international policy making chambers, minimising and countering law 
enforcements through bribery and corruption; and, sometimes sponsor politicians and 
influential persons to position of power and leadership in government to protecting their 
enterprises. In some cases, the assassination of persons that hinders the progress of the drug 
trafficking enterprise is the chosen option. 
 Willoughby (1988) observes that drug traffickers are often attracted to countries 
where there is stable political climate that guarantees the stability of currency with little or no 
foreign exchange controls as well as countries that have well defined regulatory framework 
which permits bank secrecy, marginal little tax liability, and a financial system sophisticated 
enough to handle large transactions effectively. 
 In the United Kingdom, there is different public opinion about drug abuse and drug 
trafficking. Some believe that narcotic drugs are dangerous for the health of the society, 
others argue that narcotic drugs are medicinal and that they are not any worst than tobacco 
and alcohol.  
Whatever axis one might support, it is crucial to observe that the misuse of narcotic 
drugs can have severe consequences on the individual, family and society. Tiggey, et. al., 
(2000) cited the reports compiled by the British Crime Survey in which it is claimed that an 
estimated that: 
 
“Four million people in England and Wales use illicit drugs each year. A 
minority engage in heavier use of a wider variety of narcotic drugs, including 
heroin and crack cocaine; and a proportion of this minority are users with 
serious problems of drug dependency. The costs arising from problematic drug 
are estimated at about £4 billion a year”.  
 
It is very difficult to ascertain the size of the illicit drug trade in the United Kingdom 
due to the difficulty in quantifying the volume of inward flowing narcotics and not much is 
known about the arrangement of the distribution process and how the illicit drug markets are 
responding to changes in supply and demand, and the effectiveness of the law enforcement 
(Tiggey, et. al., (2000). In 1989, the UK government confessed that it cannot accurately 
estimate the degree of illegal drug trafficking activities in the country because it “is 
notoriously difficult” (Home Office, 1989) to make such assessment. However, one thing is 
certain, drug trafficking is thriving in the United Kingdom, for instance, it was noted that: 
 
“The profit margins for major traffickers of heroin into Britain are so high they 
outstrip luxury goods companies such as Louis Vuitton and Gucci…the 
traffickers enjoy such high profits that seizure rates of 60-80% are needed to 
have any serious impact on the flow of drug into Britain but nothing greater 
than 20% has been achieved” (Guardian Newspaper, July 5, 2005). 
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Roe (2005) reports that in 1996, 48% of 16 to 24 years old people in the United 
Kingdom confirmed to having used illegal narcotic drugs at least once. Among the number 
that have used narcotic drugs in that category, 18% used the drugs within one month of the 
survey; and, in 2004/05 the British Crime Survey (cited in Roe, 2005) estimated that among 
persons between the age of 16-59, 34.5% had used at least one illicit narcotic drug, 11.3% 
used one or more illicit narcotic drugs within one year of the survey and, 6.7% within one 
month prior to the survey. The mandatory testing of people charged with drug related 
offences in 2004/5 revealed that between 36% and 66% tested positive for narcotic drug 
(predominately cocaine and heroin) use (Home Office, 2004). 
Most of the illicit narcotic drugs entering the United Kingdom are carried by foreign 
nationals, for example Green (1996); Green et. al.,(1994) and Hammond (1994, 1995,1996)  
found that only 28.3% of British citizens were jailed for drug trafficking compared to 71.7% 
of foreign nationals convicted for trafficking drug in the Britain in 1989. Among the foreign 
nationals were Nigerians, 29.8%; All other African countries, 5.6%; West Indians, 8.7%; 
Columbians, 5.3%; Pakistanis, 5.1%; Dutch, 3.3%; and, the rest of the world, 13.9%. The 
problem with the statistics is that it did not specify whether the figures were based on arrest 
at United Kingdom entry ports and/or whether it was comprehensive data of all drug 
traffickers convicted during the period. Burgess (2003) explains that drug traffickers that 
import drugs into the United Kingdom are mostly young women with dependent children and 
are often very poor; desperate for money; lacks adequate knowledge of the crime and the 
extent of the associated danger. 
 The Runciman Report (1999) on drugs misuse and drug crimes in the United 
Kingdom recommended amongst others that, the drug laws ensure fairness, consistency, 
enforceability, flexible and just. The report further lamented that full eradication of drug 
trafficking and drug misuse in the United Kingdom is not possible however, that drug 
legislation must be compatible with international human rights laws. The report concludes 
that: 
“…we see no evidence that severe custodial penalties are deterring traffickers, or that 
enforcement, however vigorous, is having a significant effect on supply…We have 
come to the conclusion that the law and, more particularly, its implementation, need 
strengthening to make it more difficult both to derive huge profits from drug 
trafficking and to reinvest those profits in the drug trade and other criminal 
enterprises for farther gain” (Runciman, 1999). 
 
The Runciman Report does not believe that the strictness of the United Kingdom drug 
laws and the severity of the drugs control regime are having much effects and deterrence. 
The development of the UK drugs laws could be traced back to the enactment of the 
Pharmacy Act 1868, followed by the Parliamentary motion of 1906 directed towards the 
elimination of the production of opium by China which subsequently led to the Chinese 
enactment of legislation which attempted to curtail opium production in 1916. In Britain, 
there was steady development of drug control laws. As of 1908 there was restriction on the 
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sale of opium to only registered pharmacist. In 1917, there was national control of cocaine, 
heroin and morphine and the enactment of the Dangerous Drugs Act 1920 followed by the 
control of cannabis in 1925; amphetamines in 1964, and LSD in 1966. 
 On international front, there has been several developments within the framework of 
the United Nations regarding drug trafficking and drugs misuse laws. For example, Article 3 
(1) (a) (i) and Article 3(2) of the UN Convention 1988 provides that:  
“Each party shall adopt such measures as may be necessary to establish as criminal 
offences under domestic law, when committed intentionally: The production, 
manufacture, extraction, preparation, offering, offering for sale, distribution, sale, 
delivery on any terms whatsoever, brokerage, dispatch, dispatch in transit, transport, 
importation or exportation of any narcotic drug or any psychotropic substance 
contrary to the provisions of the 1961 Conventions, the 1961 Convention as 
amended or the 1971 Convention”. 
 
And Article 3(2) UN Convention 1988 requires that States are to criminalise all 
offences and acts of drug possession and drug trafficking in accordance with the 
constitutional principles and basic concepts of law. This clause has created lack of uniformity 
in the enforcement of drug laws across the world in the sense that some countries modify 
drug laws to such extent that the prohibit drug possession in certain quantity is not 
punishable in law whilst other countries criminalise the possession of any quantity of 
narcotic drugs. Alongside the national drug laws are the international human rights 
obligations which are expected to go hand in hand without prejudice to national security. 
In the United Kingdom, The Medicines Act 1968 provided that the possession of 
controlled drugs and drugs that requires prescription without authority is punishable under 
the Act. The MDA 1968 merged almost all of the previous drug laws in the country. The 
Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 categorised drugs into three major headings namely: A, B and C 
with category “A” being the most dangerous and “C” being the less dangerous 
comparatively. Class A include but not limited to heroin, LSD, mescalin, methadone, 
morphine, opium, PCP, pethadine, poppy straw, psilocybin, STP, ecstasy, cocaine, coca leaf, 
dicanol, and cannabinol etc. Class B include but not limited to - codeine in concentrations 
above 2.5%, DF118, amphetamine, ritalin and barbiturates. Class C are - cannabis, 
benzodiazepines, Methaqualone, and valium.  
In accordance with the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971, each category of the drugs attracts 
different degree of legal sanction. The Act distinguishes between the offence of possession 
and the offence of trafficking. It considers trafficking as acts involving supply and or 
conspiracy to supply irrespective of the quantity of the drugs. The possession of the drug 
with the intention to supply is regarded as trafficking. The test for intent the prosecution is 
allowed to adduce evidence from wide range of sources to prove its case. Table 1 presents 
the stipulated sanctions for convicted drug offences of possession and trafficking in 
accordance with the MDA 1971. 
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Table 1: Penalties for Drug Offences under the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 
OFFENCE 
Level of 
Court Class A Drugs Class B Drugs Class C Drugs 
  Magistrates 
6 months jail 
and 3 months jail and 
3 months jail 
and  
Possession   £2000 fine £2500 fine £500 fine 
  Crown 7 years jail and  5 years jail and  2 years jail and  
    unlimited fine unlimited fine unlimited fine 
  Magistrates 
6 months jail 
and 6 months jail and 
3 months jail 
and  
Trafficking   £2000 fine £2000 fine £2000 fine 
  Crown Life jail and  14 years jail and  5 years jail and  
    unlimited fine unlimited fine unlimited fine 
 
The Controlled Drugs (Penalties) Act 1995 reinforced the MDA 1971 and particularly 
extended the jail term for street drug dealing and trafficking of narcotic drugs of the value 
one million from 12 to 14 years as in R v Aramah (1982) 4 Cr. App R (S) 407 and in R v 
Belinski (1987) 9 Cr App R (S) 360 it was held that jail term for same value illicit drugs is 
minimum of 14 years jail term. The Customs and Excise Management Act 1979 (CEMA) 
and the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 have been the major governing laws regarding drug 
trafficking in the United Kingdom. In 1994, the Drug Traffickers Act was enacted to 
compliment the other two previous laws. The legal penalties under CEMA are exactly the 
same as those under the MDA 1971 except that the fines can be heavier according to the 
financial value of the drugs found with the suspect at the time of arrest.  
 The Drug Traffickers Act 1994 and the Drug Trafficking Offences Act 1986 permits 
the law enforcement agencies to seize the assets suspected drug trafficker and, the Proceeds 
of Crime Act 2002 (PCA) made provision for the recovery of drug traffickers’ assets in the 
civil and criminal courts where there are proofs that the assets are proceeds of crime.  Under 
the PCA 2002, the burden of proof is with the suspect, who has to prove that the confiscated 
assets are not the proceeds of crimes otherwise, the court may grant order for confiscation.  
The Drugs Act 2005 provides for mandatory drug testing on arrested suspected drug 
offenders and authorise the law enforcement agencies to detain suspects in custody for up to 
192 hours to make it possible for the recovery of evidence for example where there is 
reasoning grounds to believe that the drug trafficker is concealing the evidence internally. 
Under such circumstances, the DA 2005 authorises the use of x-ray or ultrasound scanners to 
investigating the suspects’ internal organs. Where the suspect refuses to be examined 
internally, the DA 2005 allows the jury or the court to infer that the suspect is guilty of 
internally concealing the evidence. 
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RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
The United Kingdom is member of many international organizations concerned with 
tackling drug trafficking including the Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND) (an 
organisation in-charge of monitoring the implementation of the United Nations drugs 
Conventions and the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) (established in 1989 by the G7 for 
developing adequate international measures to preventing money laundering).  
In a large number of countries that subscribes to the UN Drugs Convention 1988, 
tend to impose lengthy jail terms to convicted drug traffickers however, most of the countries 
applies the criminal standard of proof in the trial of suspected drug traffickers but in the 
United Kingdom, the civil standard of proof is acceptable by the court in reaching the verdict 
of guilt and for the conviction of drug trafficking suspects which subject of intense scrutiny 
for example Henham (1994) argue that the use of civil standard to deciding criminal cases 
“has been at the expense of attenuation of offenders due process rights” and that “there are 
several major erosions of due process discernible in the Drug Trafficking Act 1994” as in R v 
Dickens (1990) 12 Cr App R (S) 191 where the court passed judgement based on the 
provision of Section 2(8) of the DTA 1994 which requires the civil standard of proof to be 
used to determine whether the defendant benefited from drug trafficking and also used to 
determine the amount to be recovered from the assets of the defendant.   
 In R v Winters [2008] WLR (D) 387 the court of Appeal applied the civil standards of 
balance of probability in reaching its decision on criminal matter. In determining whether the 
defendant benefited from drugs trafficking offence, the prosecution was required to prove 
that monies paid by the defendant towards mortgage were made from the benefits of drug 
trafficking. Following the case of R v Dickens [1990] 2 QB 102 the court held that so long as 
there is prima facie evidence of expenditure by the defendant since the beginning of the 
relevant period, the judge can assume that it was met out of payments received by him from 
drug trafficking and by failing to prove on the civil standards of probability, the prosecution 
case for confiscation of property had been reduced by £18,193.52 being the amount of money 
it claimed had been paid as mortgage, however, the court failed to rule that the said property 
of the defendant was not a benefit of drug trafficking. 
 The lowering the standard of proof and, the provisions of section 2(8) of DTA 1994 is 
incompatible with Article 6 ECHR in that it severely diminishes some of the fundamental 
rights of the defendants in criminal trials. It violates the fundamental freedom of human 
rights which guarantees fair hearing and fair trials. It therefore fails to comply with the test of 
“strict necessity” as in Van Mechelen v Netherlands [25 EHRR 647 paragraph 58] or test for 
“minimal impairment” as in the case of R v Oakes [1986] 1 SCR 103. In rare circumstances, 
the UK courts do acknowledge that the shifting of the burden of proof to the defendant is 
contrary to legal tradition, for example, in R v Lambert and others [2001] 2 WLR 211  the 
Court of Appeal expressed that the modification of the burden of proof is a departure from 
the “golden thread” which has been the main principle of English criminal law for years as 
in Woolmington v DPP [1935] AC 462, 481 where Viscount Sankey LC remarked that, “the 
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onus lies upon the prosecution in a criminal trial to prove all the elements of the offence with 
which the accused is charged”.   
 The UK courts exploits the loophole in section 3 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights which permits national courts to interpret legislation “so far as it is possible to 
do so” in a way which is compatible with the ECHR. For instance, in Lambert, the House of 
Lords attempted to clarify that, though section 28 of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 imposes 
the ‘legal burden’ of proof on the defendant; the burden is only “evidential burden” which 
does not violate the due process of the law.  
Despite the lowering of standard of proof, the imposition on the accused of reverse 
burden requiring the defendant to prove that the confiscated assets are not proceeds of crime 
violates the presumption of innocence in that the assumption that the defendant’s entire 
assets are proceeds of criminal conducts based on the existence of “probable cause” instead 
of the traditional “reasonable doubt” in the minds of the jury/court is incompatible with the 
provision of Article 6 European Convention on Human Rights which requires the courts to 
ensure fair hearing and fair trial of the accused. This argument could be substantiated by 
Allenet de Ribemont v. France A 308 (1995) 20 EHRR 557 where the European Court of 
Human Rights held that the mandatory obligations of Article 6(2) applies to both the courts 
and national public authorities.  
 The United Kingdom courts are unmindful of Allenet de Ribemont v. France for 
instance, in R v Briggs-Price [2009] UKHL 19, Mr. Briggs-Price appealed against a 
confiscation order following his conviction of conspiracy to import heroin into the United 
Kingdom. The court acknowledged that the Drug Trafficking Act 1994 provides that the civil 
standard of proof only applies to the questions as to whether the Appellant derived any 
benefits from drug trafficking; whilst the criminal standard of proof applies to the questions 
as to whether the Appellant had committed a specific drug trafficking offence. But, held that 
confiscation order is permissible against Mr. Briggs-Price under the Drug Trafficking Act 
1994 and, that it was irrelevant as to whether the Appellant (Mr. Briggs-Price) benefitted 
from drug trafficking to which he was charged and irrelevant of whether the importation of 
the drugs did not take place.  
 Though the UK court continue to ignore the ruling in Allenet de Ribemont v. France, 
in R v Aroyewuni [1994] Crim. LR 695 the Court of Appeal continued with the use of 
probable cause proof though amended the sentencing guidelines of to the importation of 
Class A drugs by declaring that the use of street value to weighing custodial terms was no 
longer applicable. There is a lot of sentencing inconsistencies in drugs related cases in the 
United Kingdom making it one of the most strangest legal system in the European Union for 
example, in R v Gallagher (1990) 12 Cr App R (S) 224 it was held that the possession of 
illicit narcotic drugs for personal use is not trafficking and the custodial sentences should not 
exceed twelve months and should be at least six months. In R v Jones (1981) 3 Cr App R (S) 
51 it was held that the sanction for possession of drugs should be a fine without custodial 
sentence. 
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 In the centre of the controversies surrounding the lowering of standard of proof and 
the shifting of burden of proof in drug trafficking cases is the crucial issue of the United 
Kingdom civil assets recovery system. The UK Assets Recovery Regime (ARR) compound 
the provisions of many laws including - the Proceeds of Crimes Act (POCA) 2002; Drug 
Trafficking Act 1994; Criminal Justice Act 1988 (as amended by the CJA 1993); and the 
CEMA 1979. It is import to note that, Part 1 of Proceeds of Crimes Act 2002 established an 
agency known as the Assets Recovery Agency (ARA).  
The Act also empowers the ARA with the role of conducting criminal restraint and 
confiscation proceedings and also to train financial investigators. Part 2 of Proceeds of 
Crimes Act 2002 authorises the Crown Courts to issue confiscation orders; the Act thus, 
makes the Crown Court the foremost place for confiscation proceedings and all matters 
related to assets recovery related offences with effect from 24 March 2003.  Part 5 of 
Proceeds of Crimes Act 2002 provides that cash could be seized from suspects inside the UK 
modifying previous legislation which only required cash to be seized at the ports of entry and 
departure. 
 Assets recovery in the UK is of two segments – “forfeiture order” and ‘confiscation 
order” (Lea, 2004). Where forfeiture order is granted to the prosecution, the defendant is 
permanently stripped of his title to property on the order hand, if a confiscation order is 
issued against the property of the defendant, he will not be stripped of his title to his property 
but will be required to pay some amount of monies in the form of a fine; however, the 
prosecution can make further application to the court for forfeiture otherwise, in the event 
that the defendant successfully overturns the confiscation order, the court will not grant 
forfeiture order. Under the present legal regime, the UK court has the power to make a 
confiscation order in cash and, where necessary, the court imposes jail term in default.  
However, defendant is entitled to seeking reduction of the confiscation order made 
under s. 17 of the Drug Trafficking Act 1994 and the Criminal Justice Act 1988 s. 83 
provided the there is reasonable grounds to substantiate that the amount to be realised from 
the confiscation is likely to much lesser than the actual value of that assessed by the Crown 
court; though, it is not straightforward matter for the defendant in that, he must apply to the 
High court for a certificate of inadequacy with which he can apply to the Crown court to 
reduce the amount of confiscation, and if the amount is in default, the reduced amount will 
reduce the jail term of the defendant.  
 In order for the law enforcement to be able to gather evidence in pursuing the assets 
of the defendants, section161 of the CEMA 1979 empowers the law enforcement agencies 
including custom officials to enter and search premises without the need for search warrants. 
The entry could involve the breaking and opening of doors, windows and containers, forcing 
and removing any obstructions in the process. The entry can be justified only if the law 
enforcement officers have reasonable grounds to suspect that anything liable to forfeiture 
and/or confiscation is kept or concealed in the premises (Dorn, 1999). The breaking and entry 
of the property of the suspect based on mere suspicion violates the rights to private and 
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family life contained in Article 8 of rights. In some instances, the act may not sufficiently 
pass the “proportionality test” contained in the European Convention on Human Rights.  
One worrying aspect of the civil assets recovery regime in the UK is that, it can still 
be executed irrelevant as to whether the defendant is found guilty of the offence of drug 
trafficking and/or drug possession. The Proceeds of Crimes Act 2002 also authorizes the 
Assets Recovery Agency to “compel a person” to give answers to questions and to provide 
all information and documents in his possession (Dorn, 2004). Where the defendant/suspect 
fails to comply with the ARA, the agency can make negative inference in the court and only 
require the proof on the civil standard (balance of probabilities).  
The Proceeds of Crimes Act 2002 has three main objectives namely: Confiscation of 
the proceeds of crime after conviction; the confiscation of assets that are arguably aiding the 
criminal activities; and, taxing the benefits derived from proceeds of crimes. 
The use of coercion by the Assets Recovery Agency to obtain confessional statements 
from the suspects is incompatible with Article 6 of the European Conventions on Human 
Rights (ECHR) and Article 10 and Article 11(1) of the United Nations Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights (UDHR) which states:  
"Everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an 
independent and impartial tribunal, in the determination of his rights and 
obligations and of any criminal charge against him". 
 
And Article 11(1) UDHR states that: 
 
“Everyone charged with a penal offence has the right to be presumed innocent 
until proved guilty according to law in a public trial at which he has had all the 
guarantees necessary for his defence”.  
 
The compelling of suspects to give evidence is a dent on the long standing legal principle 
of the rights to silence for example, in Brown v HM Advocate [1966] SLT 105 it was held 
that the “express right contained in a human rights instrument is largely non-negotiable” and 
in Teixera de Castro v Portugal 28 EHRR 101, paragraph 36; the European Court of Human 
Rights held that no policy no matter how commendable is fit to pass the test of legal scrutiny 
“if its ultimate effect is to dilute fair trial rights” and, in Matthews v UK [1999] ECHR 
24833/94 the European Court of human Rights court ruled that, international treaties that are 
passed in the aftermath of the ECHR cannot be interpreted so as to limit convention rights 
(Kingston, 2006). The convention rights it seems can only be infringed where the test for 
proportionality is passed. In de Freitas v Ministry of Agriculture [1998] 3 WLR 675, 684 the 
court outlined threefold test for proportionality inter alia:  
(i) Whether the legislative objective is sufficiently important to justify limiting a 
fundamental right;  
(ii) Whether the measures designed to meet the legislative objectives are rationally 
connected to it; and  
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(iii) Whether the means used to impair the right or freedom are no more than is 
necessary to accomplish the objective (Kingston, 2006). 
In view of the tests in de Freitas, I argue that the UK asset confiscation system “is 
irrational and devoid of proportional reasoning” (Kingston, 2006) for example in R v Michael 
Tivnan [1998] EWCA Crim 1370 the Court of Appeal said that, the Drug Trafficking Act 
1994 is draconian because (i) there is no time limit for the prosecution to apply for variation 
of confiscation orders and, (ii) drug trafficking forfeiture orders are not restricted by any 
requirement that the defendant's realisable assets must be proved to be directly derived from 
drug dealing or over the period of drug dealing but only by the amount of the total value of 
the benefits the defendant has derived from drug dealing and the realisable value of his assets 
at the time of the order or any further order (Kingston, 2006).  
The UK drug trafficking laws including the new assets recovery regime enable the State 
to manipulate the trial processes in contravention of the laid down standards of various 
international human rights instruments, for example, the new principle of “reasonable 
grounds of belief”; and the “mere suspicion”’ which is inferred as probable cause gives the 
law enforcement agencies enough powers to seize an individual’s personal assets with the 
support of the judiciary; as in R v Montila and others [2003] EWCA Crim 3082 where the 
court ruled that, on the true construction of s 49(2) of the 1994 Act it was not necessary, in 
order to prove an offence under the subsection, that the property concealed or disguised, 
converted, transferred or removed from the jurisdiction was the proceeds of drug trafficking 
or crime. The target of the subsection was as much the state of mind of the defendant as his 
conduct (Kingston, 2006).  
The United Kingdom legal system is fast becoming totalitarian as the will of the State is 
superseding the well establish human rights. For instance, Liberty (2001) submitted that the 
current system of “criminal confiscation system not only destroys the essence of the 
presumption of innocence” and also that, with regards to civil confiscation,  it is improper for 
the laws to authorise “the state a power to opt for extensive confiscation of defendant’s assets 
in circumstances where it does not have sufficient evidence to prosecute them in the criminal 
courts” and that “assuming that there is sufficient evidence to prosecute them, it would be 
wrong to allow the state to opt for an easier path of pursuing someone in the civil courts”.  
 The very contentious assets recovery regime is traceable to the ancient system of 
feudal forfeiture “in rem”- a legal procedure which focused on the criminal nature of 
property rather than the criminal conduct of the owner of the property for example in a very 
ancient case of United States v. La Vengeance 3 Dallas 297 (1796) the United States 
Supreme Court ruled that the seizure of the French ship carrying illegal arms was case of 
admiralty law which the cause was civil and that the matter was rested in rem and excluding 
the person of the defendant. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
The implications of the drift towards retribution and deterrence in the sentencing 
policy for drug traffickers are all too apparent.  The increased numbers imprisoned will 
contribute to an already grossly overcrowded and deteriorating prison situation and drug 
related crime will increase (Henham, 1994).    
 This study has assessed aspects of drug policy enforcement within the context of 
United Kingdom legal framework, International Human Rights and international drug 
conventions. Although the study demonstrates that the United Kingdom is heavy handed in 
the control of drug trafficking, nevertheless the UK has been able to formulate and 
implement domestic drug control policy in a way that furthers harm minimization in relation 
to the availability of illicit drugs. The United Kingdom has also retained rooms to manoeuvre 
within the UN conventions (Dorn, 2004).  
 This study has drawn attention to the intersection between domestic drug policies and 
international drug policies, particularly in relation to implementation policies. Whilst there is 
no apparent mismatch between the United Kingdom domestic drug policy and international 
policy goals, the latter face strong challenges. On one hand, there is at least some potential 
for reasonable progress to be made at home. On the other hand there is the possibility of 
being completely overwhelmed by abject failures internationally. At the heart of this 
conundrum is the still evolving relationship between ‘supply reduction’ and drug policies 
(Dorn, 2004).  
 Supply reduction will tend to be short-lived unless effective action is also taken to 
address the demand-side (for example, through drug treatment or effective prevention 
programmes). This is a matter of basic economic laws. If levels of demand are constant, a 
reduction in the supply of a drug will drive up the street price and make it more profitable for 
drug traffickers. If people with serious dependency problems are not being treated, they are 
unlikely to give up using illicit drugs. A similar point applies to the United Kingdom 
international initiatives towards reducing the production of drugs in Afghanistan, so long as 
demand for opiates subsist, successful initiatives to cut opium cultivation in one area will 
always lead to an increase in production elsewhere. 
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